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Abstract—Android is one of the most popular operating
systems used in mobile devices. Its popularity also renders
it a common target for attackers. We propose an efficient
and accurate three-phase behavior-based approach for detecting
and classifying malicious Android applications. In the proposed
approach, the first two phases detect a malicious application
and the final phase classifies the detected malware. The first
phase quickly filters out benign applications based on requested
permissions and the remaining samples are passed to the slower
second phase, which detects malicious applications based on
system call sequences. The final phase classifies malware into
known or unknown types based on behavioral or permission
similarities. Our contributions are three-fold: First, we propose
a self-contained approach for Android malware identification and
classification. Second, we show that permission requests from an
Application are beneficial to benign application filtering. Third,
we show that system call sequences generated from an application
running inside a virtual machine can be used for malware
detection. The experiment results indicate that the multi-phase
approach is more accurate than the single-phase approach. The
proposed approach registered true positive and false positive
rates of 97% and 3%, respectively. In addition, more than 98%
of the samples were correctly classified into known or unknown
types of malware based on permission similarities. We believe that
our findings shed some lights on future development of malware
detection and classification.
Index Terms—Android, behavioral analysis, permissions, mal-
ware, system call sequences
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past, mobile devices were used solely for making
phone calls and sending and receiving short messages. How-
ever, the rapid development of computing technology and
wireless bandwidth has turned mobile devices into universal
devices in digital life. Activities such as watching videos,
playing games, checking e-mails, and online shopping can
now be performed anytime and anywhere with an Internet-
connected mobile device. Therefore, many users have migrated
from PCs to mobile devices and the number of mobile devices
has thus grown exponentially.
Because of its openness, Android is one of the most
popular operating systems (OSs) adopted by modern mobile
devices [1]. Statistics collected in 2014 indicated that there are
more than one billion devices that run the Android OS. The
widespread deployment of Android also renders it an attractive
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target for attackers; therefore, problems associated with mobile
security are becoming more critical [2]. In addition to the
behavior of PC-based malware, mobile malware also attempts
to steal sensitive data and conducts financially motivated
attacks. Mobile malware can read the location of a user by
using built-in GPS receivers, intercept short messages, or
steal contact lists. Furthermore, such malware can send short
messages, make phone calls, or relay phone calls to gain
economic benefits. The widespread deployment of the Android
OS renders it an attractive OS to attackers.
Approaches for detecting malicious applications are com-
monly classified into two classes: static- and dynamic-based
approaches. In general, a static-based approach is faster than a
dynamic-based approach; however, a dynamic-based approach
can obtain more detailed information and thus creates the
possibility of conducting a further in-depth analysis of an
application that is being inspected. In our previous study [3],
we reported that a dynamic-based approach can generate
detecting patterns from a group of known malicious Android
applications. However, the approach was also marred by
slow performance because of the characteristics of dynamic
analysis. We attempted to speed up the training and detection
process of our previous study, however, this process is a trade-
off between detection speed and detection risk. This implies
that the detection could be evaded in some rare cases if a
malicious application can decompose the malicious software
implementation into undetectable fragments. Therefore, we
considered other possible approaches to eliminate the possibil-
ity of being evaded and improve the overall detection speed.
In this paper, we propose a hybrid approach that detects
malicious Android applications based on both static features
(the requested permissions) and dynamic features (the system
call sequences). Combining these two features enabled the
proposed approach to detect unknown malware efficiently.
The proposed detector operates in two phases. In the faster
first phase, permissions are investigated to filter out benign
applications quickly. In the slower second phase, a malicious
application is detected from the remaining applications based
on system call sequences. Furthermore, to determine whether
an identified malware is a known or an unknown malware
type, behavioral vectors are established from trained malware
samples and determine unknown malware types based on the
similarity between an inspected malware and behavior vectors.
Inspired by our previous work focusing on native Windows
binaries [4], we attempt to perform automated malicious soft-
ware classification by using a multi-phase approach. Compared
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to handling native Windows binaries, there are two major
challenges for analyzing Android binaries. First, there is not
a good classifier that is able to perform initial detection of
malicious behavior for Android applications in a reasonable
short time. Second, Android binaries are launched in a virtual
machine based runtime environment, and the system calls
could be triggered by the virtual machine itself or by the
application. Due to the aforementioned challenges, we have
to carefully design and implement our proposed approach to
adapt the differences on the Android platform.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a
brief survey of related studies is presented. Section III presents
the precise problem statement and the details of the proposed
mechanism, including the processing of permissions and sys-
tem call sequences. The experimental results are presented in
Section IV. Finally, the concluding remarks are presented in
Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Numerous approaches are available for analyzing malicious
malware on Android. In addition to antivirus software and
app inspection services such as Google Bouncer [5], we
classified the approaches proposed in previous studies into
sandboxes, static-based, and dynamic-based approaches. A
sandbox monitors the activities of Android applications by
running an application inside a constrained environment. Addi-
tional events can be sent to a running application for triggering
more application behavior. Anubis is an online dynamic anal-
ysis tool originally designed for inspecting malware running
on personal computers. The core component was developed
by Bayer et al. [6]. In 2012, Anubis included a sandbox
environment for inspecting Android applications (codename:
Andrubis). In addition to dynamic analysis in sandboxes,
Andrubis performs static analysis, yielding information such as
an application’s activities, services, required external libraries,
and actually required permission. A detailed introduction to
the design of Andrubis can be found in [7]. Huang et al. [8]
proposed android behavior monitor (ABM), which integrates
open source components and is built upon standard Android
emulator. In addition to its open design, ABM adopts several
strategies to improve code coverage including emulation of
random user inputs, sending short messages, and making
phone calls. Yan and Yin [9] proposed DroidScope to analyze
Android application behavior. DroidScope is built on Quick
Emulator (QEMU) and can reconstruct the OS- and Java-
level semantic views completely from the outside. In addition,
numerous tools, including an API tracer, native instruction
tracer, Dalvik instruction tracer, and taint tracker, have been
developed to conduct further analysis. Tam et al. [10] proposed
CopperDroid, another dynamic analysis tool built on QEMU
that has designs and implementations similar to DroidScope.
CopperDroid monitors low-level system calls and can thus
monitor malware behavior, regardless of whether such behav-
ior is initiated from Java, Java native interface (JNI), or native
code execution.
A static-based approach detects a malicious application by
inspecting only the information stored in an application in-
stallation package file such as binary signatures and requested
permissions. By contrast, a dynamic-based approach detects
a malicious application by using additional run-time informa-
tion such as accessed system resources and invoked system
calls. Kirin [11] uses permission security rules to mitigate
malware by using voice, location, or short messages; a set
of security rules is used to determine whether an application
requests specific combinations of permissions. PUMA [12]
adopts machine-learning approaches, including simple logistic,
naı̈ve Bayes, J48, and random tree approaches to classify
applications into benign or malicious applications based on
permissions. These two approaches are simple and efficient
because they analyze only the manifest file of an applica-
tion. However, a malicious application can easily evade the
detection. Numerous static-based approaches analyze the use
of Android permissions. Statistics provided by the Stowaway
project [13] indicated that one-third out of 940 applications
were provided with over-privileged permissions. Johnson et
al. [14] also reported that most developers over-requested
permissions that could cause security threats. Zhou et al. [15]
obtained the permissions and behaviors by manually analyzing
10 malware families. They used the permissions to filter
out benign applications quickly and detected the remaining
applications through behavioral footprint matching. However,
their approach is not scalable because the approach cannot be
automated.
A number of dynamic-based approaches are also available.
AAsandbox [16] observes suspicious applications by using
system call counts. Crowdroid [17] monitors system calls
invoked by an application and used a clustering algorithm
to determine whether the application is benign or malicious.
However, this approach must collect several user experiences
for the same application, otherwise it could return several false
positives. The approach detects only anomalous behaviors
of analyzed applications. Isohara et al. [18] defined three
categories of threats and there is information leakage, jail-
breaking, and destructive application detection. They gener-
ated signatures by applying a set of regular expression rules to
the name of system calls or file paths. A malicious activity in
these three categories was then detected by matching the signa-
tures. However, their system cannot detect malicious activities
except the three threat categories. Lin et al. [3] extracted
longest common substrings (LCS) of system calls for similar
malicious applications and used probabilities derived from the
Bayes model to discriminate malicious behaviors from regular
behaviors. They then detected repackaged malware with the
obtained LCS. Although the proposed layered multithread
comparison approach demonstrated a favorable efficiency, it
could be evaded if malware attempts to split system calls into
distinct threads. System call sequences can be combined from
distinct threads; however, with the approach, the false positive
rates could also be increased.
III. THREE-PHASE BEHAVIORAL DETECTION AND
CLASSIFICATION
We propose three-phase behavioral detection and classifi-
cation for handling Android malware. Unlike our previous
work [4], which heavily depends on an external malware
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Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed approach.
behavior extractor, the proposed approach is self-contained and
does not depend on other classifiers. Given a set of benign
programs (BP), a set of malicious programs (MP), and a
set of programs that must be inspected (IP), the proposed
approach attempts to detect malicious programs from the IP
and also classifies detected malware into either a known or
an unknown malware type. Figure 1 shows an overview of
the three phases: the permission-based detection (PBD) phase,
system-call-based detection (SBD) phase, and behavior-based
classification (BBC) phase. Each phase comprises a training
process and detection process. The system is first trained
with BP and MP and then used to detect malware from IP.
The details of the proposed two detection phases and one
classification phase are introduced in Sections III-A, III-B,
and III-C, respectively. Implementation issues are discussed in
Section III-D. Table I shows the notations used in this paper.
A. Permission-Based Detection Phase
The PBD phase comprises three components: the permis-
sion extractor, Bayes analyzer, and permission comparator.
In the training phase, the permission extractor retrieves built-
in permissions from each inspected application from the BP
and MP. For all the trained programs and their requested
permissions, the Bayes analyzer was used to compute the
probability of a program being malicious for each permission.
The probabilities were evaluated as follows:
P (M |pl) =
P (pl|M) · P (M)
P (pl|M) · P (M) + P (pl|B) · P (B)
, (1)
where pl represents one of the 139 built-in permissions that
must be evaluated, P (B) denotes the ratio of BP, and P (M)
denotes the ratio of MP. The terms P (pl|B) and P (pl|M)
represent the probability that pl is requested by BP and MP,
respectively. The probability P (M |pl), which indicates the
probability of an inspected application being malicious based
on the condition the application requested permission pl is
finally obtained. The permission probabilities for all of the
139 built-in permissions were obtained using Equation 1 and
stored in a permission probability (PP) vector for future use.
Given an inspected program ipk from IP in the detection
phase, the permission extractor retrieves requested built-in
permissions from the program. The permission comparator
computes the product of permission probabilities by using the
PP vector obtained in the training phase and then filters out
the program if the product is lower than a predefined threshold
Tperm. Otherwise, the application is considered a suspicious
program and is passed to the next phase for further inspection.
B. System-Call-Based Detection Phase
The SBD phase comprises four components: system call
recorder, system call sequence tokenizer, system call sequence
analyzer, and system call sequence comparator (Figure 2). In
the training phase, the system call recorder retrieves the system
calls issued from programs in BP and MP. All system calls
are collected by running a specific program in an Android
emulator. In addition to the program launch, several system
events including rebooting, receiving short messages, and
receiving phone calls are sent to the program. System calls
issued from the program are collected for a period of time.
The traces of system calls for programs in BP and MP are
then passed to the system call sequence tokenizer.
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TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN THIS ARTICLE.
Notation Description
BP Set of benign programs bpi, i = 1 ... |BP |
MP Set of malicious programs mpj , j = 1 ... |MP |
IP Set of inspected programs ipk, k = 1 ... |IP |
BBS Set of benign behavior sequences bbe, e = 1 ... |BBS|
SBS Set of suspicious behavior sequences sbf , f = 1 ... |SBS|
MBS Set of malicious behavior sequences mbg , g = 1 ... |MBS|
IBS Set of inspected behavior sequences ibh, h = 1 ... |IBS|
P Set of permissions pl, l = 1 ... |P |
PP Set of permission probabilities ppm, m = 1 ... |PP |
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Fig. 2. The working flow of the system call-based detection phase.
The system call sequence tokenizer first consolidates suc-
cessive system calls into a single call. The process is per-
formed because a system call could be issued in loops. For
example, a system call sequence of “open, read, read,
read, close” would become “open, read, close.” The
consolidated system call sequences are then inserted into either
a benign behavior sequence set (BBS) or a suspicious behavior
sequence set (SBS) depending on whether the system call
sequences are collected from BP or MP, respectively. The BBS
and SBS are then used as inputs in the system call sequence
analyzer.
The system call sequence analyzer generates a malicious
behavior sequence set (MBS) based on the input BBS and
SBS. This study used two types of MBS; the first is based
on the N-gram algorithm and the second is based on the
longest common subsequence (LCS) algorithm. The MBS for
these two types are generated based on two assumptions.
For the N-gram based MBS, we assumed that sequences
retrieved from a malicious program would also contain benign
behaviors. Therefore, the sequence of malicious behaviors can
be obtained by removing sequences of benign behaviors. We
transformed system call sequences into N-grams and then
obtained the MBS by removing the BBS from the SBS. For
the LCS-based MBS, we assumed that malicious programs
demonstrated similar behaviors. Therefore, the same malicious
sequences can be observed from different malicious programs.
The MBS can be obtained by deriving the LCS from two MPs.
The resulting MBS was then used for detection in the second
phase.
In the detection phase, given an IP, the system call recorder
operates as usual and the system call sequence tokenizer also
outputs a processed behavior sequence called the inspected
behavior sequence (IBS). The IBS is fed to the system
call sequence comparator and then compared with the MBS
obtained in the training phase. With the N-gram-based MBS,
the IP is identified as malicious if an equivalent N-gram is
discovered in the IBS. Similarly, with LCS-based MBS, the
inspected program is identified as malicious if a subsequence
is equivalent to one sequence in the MBS.
C. Behavior-Based Classification Phase
In the BBC phase, if a malicious application is detected
in the previous phase, the malware is further classified as a
known type or an unknown malware type. The BBC phase
comprises a training process and a classification process. In
the training process, a bit vector is used to denote the behavior
of a malicious application. Assume a total of k different MBSs
are observed in all training samples, each trained malicious
sample would have a bit vector of k bits, and the bits for the
corresponding malicious sequences observed in the sample are
labeled as one. The bit vectors for all the training samples
are then used to determine whether an IP is a known or an
unknown type of malware. In this study, the bit vector was
denoted as a type vector (tv). The number of tvs is equal to
or lower than the number of trained malicious samples less if
there are equivalent tvs.
In the classification process, the tv is retrieved from a
detected malicious application. The retrieved tv is then com-
pared with all the trained tvs by using a cosine similarity
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measure [19]. The cosine similarity for two tvs tv1 and tv2




The detected malicious application is then classified into a
similar class as the tv that has a higher cosine similarity than
a predefined threshold Tsim. If there is no tv with a cosine
similarity greater than Tsim, the detected malicious application
is classified as an unknown type of malware.
D. Additional Implementation Note
We took advantage of several existing tools to simplify
implementing the proposed approach. The tools were used
to retrieve permissions and system call sequences of Android
applications automatically.
1) Permission Analyzer: Because an application package
(APK) file is basically a ZIP archive file with the apk file
extension, we decompressed an application to retrieve its
permissions by using the apktool [20]. The apktool provides
assets, resources, source codes of an application (in assembly
language), and the manifest file. We retrieved permissions by
parsing only the manifest file because a developer must declare
requested permissions in this file.
2) System Call Recorder: To capture the system call
sequences of an application, the system image file
ramdisk.img was modified and strace was in-
stalled in the emulator. First, we decompressed the de-
fault ramdisk.img, installed the strace tool into
the image, and modified the init.rc file to launch
the strace tool. The strace tool is located in the
/data directory. The exact command we inserted into
the init.rc file is “/data/strace -F -ff -tt -o
/data/tracefile/zygote”. With the presented modifi-
cations, strace was launched to record system calls immedi-
ately after booting up the emulator. The output of the strace
tool was placed in /data/tracefile/zygote file.
IV. EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach,
we conducted experiments with various types of repackaged
applications. The environment of the experiment and number
of trained and inspected applications are described in Sec-
tion IV-A. Various aspects of the performance of the proposed
approaches are discussed in the remaining subsections.
A. Evaluation Environment
In this section, the training and detection processes of
the experimental environment are discussed; furthermore, we
also introduce the samples used in the experiments. Fig-
ure 3 shows the detailed procedures for the experimental
environment. The requested permissions were parsed from the
AndroidManifest.xml file contained in each APK file. All of
the components and the emulator were operated on an Intel
Core i3 3.1 GHz machine running the Ubuntu Linux OS.
The system call recorder currently launches each application
for 3 min [3]. In addition to the components, databases are
used to store permission probabilities, system call sequences,
malicious behavior sets, and tvs.
We prepared 1198 sample applications, comprising 933
benign applications and 265 malware applications, to conduct
the experiments. The sample applications were divided into
two sets (i.e., a training set and a detection set). We used
863 applications (700 benign and 163 malicious) for training
and 335 applications (233 benign and 102 malicious) for
detection. The benign applications were obtained from third-
party markets and malware were collected by Zhou et al.[21].
We also used several antivirus tools to scan all the benign
applications to ensure that they were virus-free.
B. Permission-Based Detector
First, we evaluated the PBD. We calculated the malicious
probabilities for the 139 built-in permissions by using Equa-
tion 1. The permission probabilities of an application were
multiplied together and the product is then compared against
a predefined threshold Tperm. Figure 4 shows the accuracy
of various thresholds. A higher threshold filters out more
benign and malicious applications than a lower threshold
does. Because the objective of this phase was to filter out
benign application and obtain as many malicious applications
as possible, we used a low threshold value to avoid filtering out
excessive malicious applications. We used a threshold Tperm
of 0.1 for the permission-based detector in the remaining
experiments. Although the PBD has a relatively higher false
positive rate1, it can filter out more than 75% of the benign
applications, thus reducing time costs considerably in the
subsequent phase. The PBD registered a false negative rate of
2% and false positive rate of 24%. The average time required
for inspecting an application was 2.57 s, including the unpack
and permission-retrieval time.
C. System Call Based Detector
We then evaluated SBD, which was operated by the N-
gram and LCS algorithm. When using the N-gram-based SBD,
the value of N must be selected appropriately. The value
of N in the N-gram means the unit length of system call
sequences retrieved from full system call traces and this value
affects the overall detection performance. A low value of N
filters out substantial system call sequences, thus increasing
false negatives. By contrast, a high value of N confuses
benign sequences with malicious sequences, thus increasing
false positives. We use various values of N that ranged from
2 to 150 and used an N value of 15 for the rest of our
experiments. The performance of the SBD is summarized as
follows. The N-gram-based SBD registered a false negative
rate of 0% and false positive rate of 35%. In contrast to the
N-gram-based SBD, the LCS-based SBD registered a false
negative rate of 3% and false positive rate of 14%. The average
time required to inspect an application was 600 s for both
detectors. Although each application was launched for only 3
mins, several pre-processing operations including creating a
1A false positive means that a benign application is detected as a malicious
application.
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Fig. 3. The detailed procedures to train and detect malicious applications.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of detection accuracies for one-phase and two-phase
detectors.
clean evaluation environment, installing the application, and
rebooting also consumed considerable time.
D. Effectiveness of the Two-Phase Detector
The experimental results indicated that the two-phase de-
tectors demonstrated equivalent performance in the overall
detection accuracies, regardless of the phase position of the
PBD or SBD. Therefore, we placed the PBD and SBD in
the first phase and second phase, respectively, because of
their processing efficiency. In addition to shorter processing
time, the PBD quickly filtered out more than 75% of benign
applications and registered a relatively low false negative rate
(approximate 2%).
This section further presented the evaluated performance
of the combined two-phase detector. Figure 5 shows the
performance of one-phase detectors and the combined two-
phase detectors. For the one-phase detectors, the PBD and
SBD produced poor performance in detecting malicious ap-
plications. We examined the cause of the false negatives
and false positives and we discovered that for the PBD,
some malicious applications request only a few noncritical
permissions. Therefore, those applications cannot be detected
by the PBD. The false negatives reported for the PBD were
safe because a malicious application that does not possess
appropriate permissions cannot cause damage. Regarding the
false positives, the difficulty in detecting malicious applica-
tions based on permissions increased because it is challenging
for Android developers to declare a minimum set of required
permissions [13]. For the SBD, we analyzed the undetected
malicious applications and discovered that the false negatives
were caused by untouched malicious parts. Because the system
events sent by the SBD are limited, if malicious parts are not
triggered, the corresponding malicious sequences cannot be
captured. The false positives were caused by two major factors.
First, because most Android malware applications are repack-
aged applications, benign and malicious sequences are always
mixed. Second, Android applications are launched in its own
virtual machine. Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish
system call sequences generated by the virtual machine or
inspected application. Nevertheless, when combined, the PBD
and SBD complement each other and obtain a more favorable
performance compared with the single-phase detectors.
E. Behavior Based Classifier
This section presents the evaluation of the performance
of the BBC. Based on the type of classification [21], we
used 22 types of malware and divided them into two sets.
One set comprised known types of malware and the other
set comprised unknown malware types. The behavior was
represented as a tv constructed from various sources, including
LCS-based system call sequences, permissions, or mixed.
We generated tvs from one half of the malicious samples
belonging to the set that comprises known types and then
classified the remaining malicious samples into either known
or unknown malware types. The tvs used to classify malicious
applications were constructed from the LCS-based system call
sequences, permissions, or mixed. The BBC works only for
applications that have been detected by the two-phase detector.
We first demonstrated that tvs can efficiently classify mal-
ware types. A detected malicious application was classified
into the appropriate class by evaluating cosine similarities.
A malicious application was classified into the type that
demonstrated maximum cosine similarities. We used two
strategies to classify malware types: the greedy strategy and
regular strategy. In the greedy strategy, no threshold was used
to filter out a low value of cosine similarity. A malicious
application was always classified into one type if the value
of its cosine similarity value was not zero. By contrast, in
regular strategy, low values of cosine similarity were filtered
out by using a threshold. If a similarity value was less than a
predefined threshold, the malicious application was classified
as an unknown malware type.
For the greedy strategy, the correctly classified rates for
the tvs constructed from LCS-based system call sequences,
permissions, and mixed were 93%, 99%, and 96%, respec-
tively. The correctly classified rate is applicable only for the
set of known malware types because malware from the set of
unknown types were always classified incorrectly. The regular
strategy must be used instead of the greedy strategy to classify
unknown malware types. We used different cosine similarity
thresholds for tvs constructed from different sources. The op-
timal thresholds we obtained from the system-call-sequence-
based, permission-based, and mixed tv were 0.5, 0.8, and 0.65,
respectively. Table II shows the classification results. Based on
the results of the greedy strategy and optimized threshold, we
Y.-D. LIN et al.: THREE-PHASE DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION FOR ANDROID MALWARE 163
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS FOR KNOWN AND UNKNOWN MALWARE TYPES.
Vector Malware Type Classified as ...
Known
Correct Type: 83%



















concluded that the permission-based tv demonstrated optimal
performance in classifying malware types.
Finally, it is impossible to predict the type of unknown
malware in real applications when detecting unknown malware
types. Therefore, for the correctly classified results of unknown
malware types, the 11 unknown types of malware were treated
as one large group without detecting the number of types in
this group.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose a three-phase behavior-based approach for
detecting and classifying Android malware. The proposed
approach achieved a high detection performance and accuracy.
In the proposed approach, the first two phases detect malicious
applications and the final phase classifies a detected malware.
We detected and classified malicious applications from two
aspects (i.e., permissions and system call sequences). The
experimental results indicated that the proposed approach
achieved optimal performance with a true positive rate of
more than 97% and false positive rate of less than 3%. For
classifying the malware type, the proposed approach correctly
classified more than 98% of the detected applications into
known and unknown malware types. Although permission or
system call sequences alone are not efficient detectors, the
results indicated that the two features complement each other.
We also concluded that permission vectors can efficiently
classify detected malicious applications into the appropriate
class of malware types. The difficulty in detecting malicious
applications is increasing. We believe that an appropriate
solution for designing and implementing effective approaches
may involve hybrid features and multiphase designs.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Butler, “Android: Changing the mobile landscape,” IEEE Pervasive
Computing, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 4–7, 2011.
[2] D. Dagon, T. Martin, and T. Starner, “Mobile phones as computing
devices: the viruses are coming!” IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol. 3,
no. 4, pp. 11–15, 2004.
[3] Y.-D. Lin, Y.-C. Lai, C.-H. Chen, and H.-C. Tsai, “Identifying android
malicious repackaged applications by thread-grained system call se-
quences,” Computers & Security, vol. 39, pp. 340–350, November 2013.
[4] Y.-D. Lin, Y.-C. Lai, C.-N. Lu, P.-K. Hsu, and C.-Y. Lee, “Three-
phase behavior-based detection and classification of known and unknown
malware,” Security and Communicatoin Networks, vol. 8, no. 11, pp.
2004–2015, July 2015.
[5] H. Lockheimer, “Android and security,” February 2012.
[Online]. Available: http://googlemobile.blogspot.tw/2012/02/android-
and-security.html
[6] U. Bayer, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda, “TTAnalyze: A tool for analyzing
malware,” in Proceedings of the 15th European Institute for Computer
Antivirus Research Annual Conference, ser. EICAR, 2006.
[7] M. Lindorfer, M. Neugschwandtner, L. Weichselbaum, Y. Fratantonio,
V. van der Veen, and C. Platzer, “Andrubis - 1,000,000 Apps Later:
A View on Current Android Malware Behaviors,” in Proceedings of
the the 3rd International Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and
Gathering Experience Returns for Security (BADGERS), 2014.
[8] C.-Y. Huang, S.-P. Ma, M.-L. Chang, C.-H. Chiu, and T.-C. Huang,
“An open and automated android behavior monitor in cloud,” Journal
of Internet Technology, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 297–305, Mar 2014.
[9] L. K. Yan and H. Yin, “DroidScope: Seamlessly reconstructing the OS
and Dalvik semantic views for dynamic android malware analysis,” in
Proceedings of the 21st USENIX Security Symposium, ser. Security’12.
Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2012, pp. 29–29.
[10] K. Tam, S. J. Khan, A. Fattori, and L. Cavallaro, “CopperDroid: Auto-
matic reconstruction of Android malware behaviors,” in Proceedings of
the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. The Internet
Society, 2015.
[11] W. Enck, M. Ongtang, and P. McDaniel, “On lightweight mobile phone
application certification,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security, 2009.
[12] B. Sanz, I. Santos, C. Laorden, X. Ugarte-Pedrero, P. G. Bringas, and
G. lvarez, “Puma: Permission usage to detect malware in android,”
in Proceedings of International Joint Conference CISIS12-ICEUTE12-
SOCO12, 2012.
[13] A. P. Felt, E. Chin, S. Hanna, D. Song, and D. Wagner, “Android
permissions demystified,” in Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security, 2011, pp. 627–638.
[14] R. Johnson, Z. Wang, C. Gagnon, and A. Stavrou, “Analysis of android
applications’ permissions,” in Proceedings of IEEE 6th International
Conference on Software Security and Reliability Companion (SERE-C),
2012.
[15] Y. Zhou, Z. Wang, W. Zhou, and X. Jiang, “Hey, you, get off of
my market: Detecting malicious apps in ofcial and alternative android
markets,” in Proceedings of the 19th Annual Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium, 2012.
[16] T. Blasing, L. Batyuk, A.-D. Schmidt, S. A. Camtepe, and S. Albayrak,
“An android application sandbox system for suspicious software detec-
tion,” in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Malicious
and Unwanted Software, 2010.
[17] I. Burguera, U. Zurutuza, and S. Nadjm-Tehrani, “Crowdroid: behavior-
based malware detection system for android,” in Proceedings of the 1st
ACM workshop on Security and privacy in smartphones and mobile
devices, 2011.
[18] T. Isohara, K. Takemori, and A. Kubota, “Kernel-based behavior analysis
for android malware detection,” in Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security, 2011.
[19] C. D. Manning, P. Raghavan, and H. Schtze, Introduction to Information
Retrieval. Cambridge University Press, 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://nlp.stanford.edu/IR-book/
[20] R. Winiewski and C. Tumbleson, “android-apktool: A tool for reverse
engineering android apk files,” February 2013. [Online]. Available:
https://code.google.com/p/android-apktool/
[21] Y. Zhou and X. Jiang, “Dissecting android malware: Characterization
and evolution,” in Proceedings of the 33rd IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, 2012, pp. 95–109.
164 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS SOFTWARE AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2016
Ying-Dar Lin is professor of computer science, and
founder and director of the Network Benchmarking
Lab, and founder of the Embedded Benchmarking
Lab at National Chiao Tung University. His research
interests include design, analysis, implementation,
and benchmarking of network protocols and algo-
rithms; quality of service; network security; deep-
packet inspection; P2P networking; and embedded
hardware/software codesign. He is an IEEE fellow
and on the editorial boards of IEEE Transactions
on Computers, Computer, IEEE Network, IEEE
Communications Magazine Network Testing Series, IEEE Communications
Surveys and Tutorials, IEEE Communications Letters, Computer Commu-
nications, Computer Networks, and IEICE Transactions on Information and
Systems. Contact him at ydlin@cs.nctu.edu.tw.
Chun-Ying Huang received the Ph.D. degree in
electrical engineering from National Taiwan Univer-
sity in 2007. He joined the faculty of the Department
of Computer Science and Engineering at National
Taiwan Ocean University in 2008 and has been an
associate professor since 2013. His research interests
include multimedia networking, system security, and
embedded systems. Dr. Huang is a member of IEEE,
ACM, IICM, and CCISA. He can be reached at
chuang@ntou.edu.tw.
Yu-Ni Chang received the B.S. degree in Com-
puter Science and Engineering from the National
Taipei University of Technology, Taiwan, in 2011,
and the M.S. degree in Computer Science from
the National Chiao Tung University in 2013. Her
researches focus on mobile security, malicious ap-
plication analysis, and wireless networking. She is
now an engineer in MediaTek. Contact her at yu-
nichang.cs00g@g2.nctu.edu.tw.
Yuan-Cheng Lai received the Ph.D. degree in com-
puter science from National Chiao Tung University
in 1997. He joined the faculty of the Department of
Information Management at National Taiwan Uni-
versity of Science and Technology in 2001 and has
been a professor since 2008. His research inter-
ests include wireless networks, network performance
evaluation, network security, and content network-
ing. He can be reached at laiyc@cs.ntust.edu.tw.
Y.-D. LIN et al.: THREE-PHASE DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION FOR ANDROID MALWARE 165
